to a first approximation, that a light of any spatial frequency that appears whitish to humans will either appear whitish to macaques, or be responded to as a null stimulus by the ensemble of macaque cells that comprise a particular chromatic system.
COLOreD LIGHTS
In regard to colored lights, an opponent cell will indeed increase its firing to luminance increments (as well as to equiluminant color increments) but this does not at all imply confounding; rathe, r, in both cases, the cell will signal more color. Alternatively stated, when one increases the luminance (or radiance, or energy, etc.) of a colored light, any theory must predict that its chromaticness (as well as its whiteness) will increase. Otherwise, incrementing the luminance of a colored light would be equivalent to dcsaturating it.
For example, within opponent theory, if one increments the luminance of a red light, then not only must nonopponent cells increase firing so there is more whiteness, but also opponent, say R/G, cells must increase firing so that there is more redness, thereby producing at least approximate invariance of the apparent saturation of the light. (Of course, if one increments the light's redness, i.e. purity, at equal luminance, then nonopponent cells will not be affected but opponent cells must again increase firing; to signal increased saturation of redness.) Therefore, for colored lights, the De Valois' statement that an opponent cell will fire to both luminance and color changes is absolutely true, but confounding is not involved--rather, the opponent cell is in both cases signaling more color, as it must. Wavelength (nm) gesting that the Standard Model was in error, we reconsidered the problem. We began with the observed characteristics of the anatomy and physiology, at the first two stages of our model, and then postulated a third stage at which we made only minimal assumptions about further processing, asking how well such a simple model could account for various behavioral observations. Guth raises several points with respect to this paper. We respond to each of these points in turn.
In a recent

LACK OF REFERENCE TO HIS 1991 MODEL PAPER
We mentioned in our paper others who had previously put forth three-stage models, including Miiller some 60 yr ago, and apologize for not having included paper in that list. We certainly should have cited his paper (although we did cite earlier papers of his), but we should note, as we discuss more extensively below, that since his modeling approach and ours are almost orthogonal we do not see his color-model paper as being as relevant to our model as he dearly believes it to be.
THE DISCRETE VS THE INDISCRIMINATE VERSION OF OUR MODEL
First, we note that Guth has kindly pointed out an error in our paper with respect to one of our figures. The error was in the figure legend, not in the figure itself. We described two alternative versions of our model. In our original manuscript, we included figures showing each stage of each of the two alternative models. Since all the relevant information was fully given in the text, two figures were eliminated from the final draft in the interest of economy of space. Unfortunately, two figure legends were accidentally exchanged in the process. Thus, as Guth notes, the second-stage response functions shown in our previous Fig. 2 are of the discrete version of our model, not the indiscriminate one indicated in the figure legend. Lo then, should have been labeled L -M rather than L-(LMS), and Mo should have been M-L. (There is a second, more serious, typographical error in the paper that we would also like to correct. On p. 1060, paragraph 6, the word now was misprinted as not, thus inverting the meaning of the sentence for anyone who did not recognize this as being a typographical error.)
In Fig. 1 of this reply we show the second stage for the indiscriminate version of our model, with Lo: Mo: So scaled 10: 5 : 1, reflecting our assumption of a 10: 5 : 1 ratio of L: M: S cones, with each central cone feeding the receptive field centers of (two) midget bipolars. Thus Fig.  1 reflects the postulated population response of the system at the second stage. Guth's Fig. 1 has the same data scaled with a 1 : 1 : 1 ratio of Lo: Mo: So, which would correspond to the assumed response characteristics of individual units at this level.
In responding to his comments on the two versions of our model (and on the third-stage yellow function), it is important to point out what we were attempting to accomplish, and what the constraints were that we put on our model, Both were very different from approach. His goal seems to have been that of finding some set of combinations of cone outputs that would match certain psychophysical data. His model is constrained by the observed anatomy and physiology solely in the choice of cone pigments. Beyond that constraint, he has freely chosen cone weighting functions and coefficients (out to three decimal points) for interactions at each of two stages to fit the psychophysical data, ignoring information on actual cone proportions, on the nature of anatomical connections in the retina, on the nature of the receptive field structure of ganglion and geniculate cells, and so forth. It is essentially a black-box approach to the problem: what circuitry can one postulate to be in the black box to get from input A to output B? This is a perfectly legitimate and valuable approach to the problem, but it is very different to the one we take.
What we have attempted to do in our model is almost diametrically opposed to Guth's approach. We have made the early stages of the model correspond to, and be totally constrained by, our best estimates of what takes place at those levels, according to studies of the anatomy and physiology of the retina and geniculate. Thus the cone proportions we postulate are based on best estimates of actual retinal proportions (known well for S cones and somewhat less certainly far L and M cones); we have six opponent cell types at the second stage, corresponding to the pair of midget bipola~rs picking up from each central cone and to the six varieties of LGN parvo cells seen physiologically; we assume either totally (indiscriminate version) or largely (discrete version) random neural connectivity, with no arbitrary weighting functions. We then ask whether some simple interaction at a further stage of processing could accomplish two things: separate color and luminance information (which is confounded in the responses of cells at the second stage), and lead to separate color channels whose spectral response properties would correspond approximately to the colors seen in diffenmt spectral regions. We found that this could be accomplished if one discarded the idea, embedded in the Standard Model, that the S-opponent cells essentially constitute the yellow-blue system. Instead, we see the M-opponent and L-opponent cells as forming the main inputs to all the color systems, with the S-opponent cells acting in effect as color modulators.
Given our approach, then, whether the randomconnectivity version of our model, or the more discrete (but still largely random) version, is better is a question to be decided solely by the anatomical and physiological evidence, not by which better fits the psychophysical data. Guth refers to the indiscriminate version of our Mo function as being the "true" one. We believe that the jury is still out on this question: considerable, but not all, physiological evidence suggests specific connectivity from different cone types to the various ganglion cell and geniculate cell varieties; but considerable anatomical evidence shows random neural connectivity, particularly at the receptor-horizontal[ cell-bipolar cell level.
THE INDISCRIMINATE Mo FUNCTION AS THE
RG SYSTEM Guth correctly notes that the discrete and indiscriminate versions of our second-stage Mo mechanism differ primarily in their responses in the short wavelengths, and that the indiscriminate version of our Mo looks much like our third-stage RG function. He argues from this that "a theorist could simply not bother to create Lo... "and that " . . . in terms of the goal of modeling acceptable RG perceptual response functions within their indiscriminate version, the D&D third stage would not be necessary and their model would be moot". Inspection of both the Lo and Mo functions, see Fig. 1 , should make it immediately clear why this second stage by itself would be inadequate. As Guth notes, the Mo function has the same sign at both long and short wavelengths and would therefore respond in the same direction to stimuli we see as red and reddish blue. He fails to note, however, that the Lo opponent mechanism does not. It gives a negative response to all wavelengths below about 560 nm, and its response at short wavelengths is significantly greater than that of the Mo mechanism. To ignore the L-opponent cells--about half of the total opponent-cell population--in discussing the RG opponent mechanism is obviously inappropriate. We do not arbitrarily abolish opponent cell types for convenience in modeling the color functions. Rather, we are attempting to develop a model that at substriate levels, which have been carefully studied, is determined completely by the best available anatomical and physiological evidence. Guth's conclusion that our third stage is unnecessary also ignores one of our other stated goals, the unconfounding of color and luminance, which requires a further stage of processing, as we discuss further below.
So AS THE BY SYSTEM
Guth also argues that our third stage is unnecessary because the second-stage So could form a reasonable BY color system. This ignores the evidence, which we discussed at some length in our paper, that under conditions in which the S cones are non-functional (e.g. in unilateral tritanopes and in normal observers viewing tiny foveal spots), one not only still sees blue, but the spectral range seen as blue expands, all the way to c. 560 nm. It was these studies that led us to postulate that M, not S, cones form the main input to blue, and they are why we argue that the second-stage So function does not form a reasonable BY color system.
THE SHAPE OF THE YELLOW FUNCTION
Guth comments that our third-stage yellow function is unsatisfactory. We agree that it is not completely correct, but were not too distressed by the discrepancy. Despite having cone proportions and inputs to the third stage totally constrained by the data from empirical studies (rather than having receptor proportions and coefficients for the interactions at each level arbitrarily chosen to fit the perceptual data, as he does in his model), and not introducing any non-linearities, our third-stage functions ended up surprisingly close to the color-naming data with the simple combination of geniculate cells in the novel way we suggest. Furthermore, this third-stage interaction also accomplishes an important additional goal, that of separating color and luminance information, which is confounded in the responses of cells at lower levels. An additional important feature of our model is that it has separate red and green systems, not one unitary redgreen mechanism, and separate blue and yellow systems. This makes it possible to include in future revisions of the model those asymmetries between red and green, and between yellow and blue, which are increasingly being found in psychophysical studies. Incidentally, this would also permit simple modifications to improve the yellow function.
LUMINANCE-COLOR CONFOUNDING
In his dismissal of the problem of luminance-color confounding, Guth ignores the receptive field organization of ganglion and geniculate cells (our stage 2), and in effect considers only the situation of stimuli that are uniform across the visual field. The confounding of color and luminance by cells early in the visual pathway has nothing to do with what white might be for a monkey, or with achromatic vs chromatic luminance variations. Rather, it is intrinsic to the nature of the receptive fields of ganglion and geniculate cells, and it is true for achromatic as well as chromatic luminance variations over virtually the entire spatial frequency range.
The issue is as follows. Receptors totally confound color and luminance variations, responding equivalently to a change in the intensity or the wavelength of light (this has come to be called the Principle of Univariance). These variables are only partially unconfounded at the level of ganglion and LGN cells: the spectrally nonopponent magno cells in general respond to luminance but not equiluminant wavelength variations, but most spectrally opponent parvo cells respond to both luminance and equiluminant wavelength variations, their relative sensitivity to luminance or color variations depending on the spatial frequency of the stimulus. Contrary to Guth's comments, this is true for achromatic as well as chromatic luminance variations.
We discussed, many years ago (De Valois & De Valois, 1975) , how the receptive field organization of parvo cells leads to such luminance--color confounding, and provided experimental evidence that supported our analysis . Many studies since then have confirmed the point. In our color model paper which is under discussion, we went through the argument again, illustrating the problem in Figs 3 and 4 , but it appears to need restatement. Spectrally opponent cells minimize responsivity to luminance variations relative to color variations by virtue of the antagonistic inputs to their receptive field centers and surrounds from different cone types (e.g. +Lc -Ms). However, responses to luminance variations are not eliminated since the centers are generally stronger than surrounds, and, in particular with the LM opponent cells, the centers and surrounds are not coextensive. The receptive fields of such opponent cells can be well modeled by a difference of two gaussians of opposite sign (from different cone types) and with smaller sigma for center than surround (see Croner & Kaplan, 1995 for a recent quantitative study of this). Therefore, high spatial frequencies excite just the center mechanism and thus just one cone type (e.g. in the case of a + Lc -Ms cell, just the L cones). Under these circumstances then, there is exactly the same total confounding of color and luminance information that is present at the receptor level. As the spatial frequency is lowered, producing increasing activation of the surround as well as the center, luminance sensitivity decreases, while chromatic sensitivity increases. Therefore parvo cells respond to both luminance and color, with their relative responsiveness to the two types of stimuli dependent on the spatial frequency of the stimulus. Given the considerable psychophysical and perceptual evidence for an eventual separation of color and luminance, a third-stage interaction such as we postulated, that among other things separates color and luminance, would indeed be required.
